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II.

INTRODUCTION

The issue on this appeal is the meaning of the general uncapitalized term
“state” in Chapter 2, of Title 5 of the Idaho Code. Either the general term has a
consistent meaning—defined by this Court in 1901—that is distinct from the
Legislature’s use of specific terms in other sections of Chapter 2, or the general
capitalized term “state” has different meanings, depending on which section of
Chapter 2 of Title 5 is considered. To preserve a harmonious reading across all of
Chapter 2 of Title 5, this Court should reaffirm its holding in Bannock County v.
Bell and hold that the general uncapitalized term “state,” as it appears in § 5-216
and § 5-225, is a general reference to all of Idaho’s governmental entities.
III.

REPLY ARGUMENT

1. The cannons of construction applicable to this case weigh towards
harmonizing the general term “state” across Chapter 2 of Title 5.
HK and the District Court assert that there is a cannon of construction that
requires courts to interpret exceptions from statutes of limitations strictly.
However, this is not the only cannon of construction applicable to this case. No
cannon of construction is wholly dispositive and conflicting maxims can often point
to two different interpretations. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Coal Co., 573 U.S.
___, 134 S.Ct. 2228, 2237 (2014). The cannons of construction weigh heavily towards
harmonizing the general term “state” across § 5-216 and § 5-225. There are at least
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three other cannons that support exempting Idaho’s governmental subdivisions
from the statute of limitation in this case.
First, there is a long standing principle of statutory construction that the
same word will have a consistent meanings within a single chapter of the Idaho
Code. See State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689–90 (2003) (statutes are construed in
pari materia). This Court explained the principle well in St. Luke’s Magic Valley
Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County. 149 Idaho 584, 589 (2010). In that case,
this Court explored two sections that both used the term “resources.” Id. In
harmonizing the two sections this court stated, “[w]e do not view the Legislature as
having intended the word “resources” to have different meanings within Chapter
35, Title 31.” Id. This Court should apply the same principle to § 5-216 and § 5-225,
and hold that the Legislature did not intend the general term “state” to have
different meanings within Chapter 2 of Title 5.
When a different definition is applied the same term that also appears in a
different related section, absurd results follow. Yager, 139 Idaho at 689–90. The
District Court’s erroneous interpretation in this case resulted in an absurd result.
In essence, the District Court held that § 5-216 applies to the City because the City
is the “state,” but § 5-216’s exemption does not apply because the City is not the
“state.” This Court should correct this erroneous application of § 5-216 and § 5-225.
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A second applicable cannon states that statutes are to be construed on the
presumption that the Legislature had a full knowledge of existing judicial decisions
that give some terms and phrases specific meanings when the Legislature amends a
statute. St. Luke’s Reg. Med. Cntr. Ltd. v. Bd. Of Com’rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho
753, 758 (2009). This Court had consistently upheld its holding in Bannock County
v. Bell (which defined the general term “state” to include all of Idaho’s subdivisions)
several times before the Legislature amended § 5-216 in 1939. See Blaine County v.
Butte County, 45 Idaho 193 (1927); Little v. Emmett Irr. Dist., 45 Idaho 486 (1928);
Lemhi Cnty v. Boise Live Stock Loan Co., 47 Idaho 712 (1929). The Legislature was
therefore aware of this Court’s consistent application of the general term “state” as
a term that included Idaho’s governmental subdivisions when it amended § 5-216 to
read that “[t]he limitations prescribed by this section shall never apply to actions in
the name or for the benefit of the state.” The Legislature could have added the
words “of Idaho” to limit § 5-216’s exception. The Legislature did not. As a result,
this Court should look to the only word that the Legislature actually wrote. That
word was the general uncapitalized term “state,” which had consistently been
interpreted by this Court as a general reference to all of Idaho’s governmental
entities.
A third cannon of statutory construction that supports harmonizing the term
“state” is that statutes of limitation, when applied to bar the rights of the
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government, must receive a strict construction in favor of the government. E. I. Du
Point De Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 460 (1924). While this Court has
never had occasion to recognize this longstanding principle, the United States
Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and other state courts have. E.g., id.; State
of California v. Montrose Chemical Corp. of Cal., 104 F.3d 1507, 1512 (9th Cir.
1997) (“statutes of limitations are to be strictly construed in favor of the
government.”); see also Anderson v. Security Mills, 133 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tenn.
1939); Kansas Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 941 P.2d 1321,
1333 (Kan. 1997) (stating that all doubts as to whether a statute of limitations runs
against the government to be resolved in favor of the government); Oklahoma City
Municipal Improvement Auth. v. HTB, Inc., 769 P.2d 131, 134 (Okla. 1998) (stating
that public policy requires every reasonable presumption favor governmental
immunity from statutes of limitations.); South Carolina Mental Health Comm’n v.
May, 83 S.E.2d 713, 717 (S.C. 1954) (stating that statues of limitations in proper
cases will run against the government but such limitations must be strictly
construed in favor of the government); Des Moines Cnty. v. Harker, 34 Iowa 84, 86
(1871) (stating doubts about statute of limitations should be resolved in favor of the
government). HK is seeking to enforce § 5-216’s limitation against the City-a
governmental entity. This Court should construe the question of whether the
general term “state” applies to the City in favor of all Idaho’s governmental entities.
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While there are competing cannons of construction that bear on the meaning
of the general term “state,” this Court should apply the cannons of construction that
will result in harmony. Ashely v. Dept. of Health and Welfare, 108 Idaho 1, 2 (1985).
Not only a harmony between § 5-216 and § 5-225’s use of the exact same language,
but also a result that will harmonize this Court’s decision in this case with this
Court’s previous decisions.
2. The District Court erred by adding words to the statute when it held that the
general term “state” in § 5-216 was synonymous with the specific term “state
of Idaho” that appears in other sections of the Idaho Code, including § 5-218.
The District Court erred by added the words “of Idaho” to modify Idaho Code
§ 5-216’s use of the general term “state.” By doing so, the District Court did not give
the plain language meaning of the uncapitalized general term “state.” HK argues
that the City is trying to add the words “political subdivisions” to circumvent the
statute’s express exemption for only the “State of Idaho.” The City would agree with
HK if Chapter 2 of Title 5 had a definition section that specifically defined the
uncapitalized term “state.” But the Legislature never defined the general
uncapitalized term “state.” The City would also concede if the Legislature had
added words of limitation, like “of Idaho,” as the Legislature did in § 5-218. But the
Legislature did not add the words “of Idaho,” as it did in other sections of the Idaho
Code.
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The only definition for the uncapitalized term “state,” as it appears in
Chapter 5 of Title 2, was provided by this Court in Bannock County v. Bell. In that
case, this Court held the general uncapitalized term “state” included all Idaho’s
cities, counties, and other governmental subdivisions. 8 Idaho 1 (1901). There are
only two sections of Chapter 2 of Title 5 that use the general uncapitalized term
“state,” § 5-216 and § 5-225. In fact, these two section use virtually identical
language1. All other sections in Chapter 2 of Title 5 use specific terms, like “state of
Idaho or any political subdivision” in § 5-218, or the extensively defined
“governmental unit” in § 5-2472. The fact that the Legislature used different specific
terms in other sections of the Idaho Code but the exact same general term in
§ 5-216 and § 5-225 should not be dismissed. As this Court recently instructed,
when the Legislature uses the same word in a two different sections of the same
chapter of the Idaho Code, the Legislature intended that word to have a consistent

1

Idaho Code § 5-225 reads “The limitations prescribed in this chapter apply to actions brought in
the name of the state, or for the benefit of the state, in the same manner as to actions by private
parties.” (emphasis added)
The relevant portion of § 5-216 reads “The limitations prescribed by this section shall never apply to
actions in the name or for the benefit of the state and shall never be asserted nor interposed as
a defense to any action in the name or for the benefit of the state . . . .
2

The relevant portion of § 5-247 reads, “(1) In this section, “governmental unit” means:
(a) A political subdivision of the state, including a municipality or county; and
(b) Any other agency of government whose authority is derived from the laws or constitution
of this state.”
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meaning across the chapter. St. Luke’s Magic Valley Reg. Med. Cntr. Ltd. v. Bd. Of
Cnty. Com’rs of Gooding Cnty., 149 Idaho at 588.
There is only one authoritative interpretation of the term “state.” The
interpretation announced by this Court in Bannock County v. Bell3 and then
affirmed in Blain County v. Butte County4, which includes all Idaho’s government
subdivions as part of the “state.” In order to apply § 5-216 harmoniously, in context
with this Court’s prior decisions, the general uncapitalized term “state” must
include all of Idaho’s governmental subdivions, including the City of Idaho Falls.
The City does not ask this Court to read any additional words into § 5-216’s
general uncapitalized term “state.” Instead the City asks that the Court read only
what the Legislature has actually written and follow the principles of stare decisis.
By holding that the general uncapitalized term “state” was synonymous with the
specific term “State of Idaho,” the District Court erred by adding words to § 5-216
that were not included by the Legislature. In an effort to justify ignoring this

3

“The statute of limitations of this state is expressly made applicable to the state. It is, therefore,
applicable to the counties of the state.” Bannock Cnty. v. Bell, 8 Idaho 1, 65 P. 710, 712 (1901). “It is
held in the majority opinion that, as the statute of limitations runs against the state and every
subdivision of it.” Id. at 712 (Quarles, C.J., dissenting).
4

“[B]eing applicable to the state, it is applicable to the counties of the state.” Blaine County v. Butte
County, 45 Idaho 193, 261 P. 338, 340 (1927) (citing to Bannock Cnty v. Bell, 8 Idaho 1, 65 P. 710,
712 (1901).
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Court’s definition of the general term “state,” the District Court went so far as to
rely on the Idaho Administrative Code.
At its most basic level, the Administrative Code is collection of the Executive
Branch’s interpretations of specific parts of the Idaho Code. See J.R Simplot Co.,
Inc., v. Idaho State Tax Com’n, 120 Idaho 849, 862–63 (1991). After the Legislature
assigns an Executive agency to enforce and administer a section of the Idaho Code,
Idaho courts typically defer to that agency’s interpretations of the statute it was
tasked with enforcing. Id. However, no deference is due to an Executive agency’s
interpretation of a statute the agency has no authority to administer. Id. In this
case, no Executive agency of the State of Idaho has been tasked with interpreting or
enforcing the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title 5. For that reason, the terms and
interpretations of the Idaho Administrative Code have no relevance to the
interpretation of the general term “state” in Chapter 2 of Title 5 of the Idaho Code.
See Mulder v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 52, 57 (2000) (stating that the
Idaho Supreme Court “has the ultimate responsibly to construe legislative
language”).
The District Court should have looked first to this Court’s judicial opinions
that dealt with Chapter 2 of Title 5 before exploring the Executive Branch’s
interpretations of other, unrelated, sections of the Idaho Code. See Yager, 139 Idaho
at 689–90 (“It is a fundamental law of statutory construction that statutes that are
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in pari materia are to be construed together.”). As a result, the City respectfully
requests that this Court to reverse the District Court’s decision, and instruct the
District Court to apply this Court’s definition of the general term “state,” as adopted
in Bannock County v. Bell.
3. HK’s reliance on Bevis v.Wright does not shed any light on the meaning “for
the benefit of the state” (as it appears in § 5-216 and § 5-225) because Bevis v.
Wright did not interpret any statutory language.
Bevis v. Wright, mentions the phrase “benefit of the state” only once, and does
not address judicial interpretation of a statute, let alone any section of Chapter 2 of
Title 5. 31 Idaho 676, 175 P. 815, 816 (1918). This appeal focuses primarily on the
correct application of statutory construction. HK seems to suggest that Bevins v.
Wright essentially stands for the position that those programs, contracts, and taxes
pursued by Idaho’s governmental subdivisions, which only sometimes benefit the
State of Idaho, are invalid. However, this Court upheld the exhibition tax in Bevins
that HK suggests was improper due to the “tenuous” connection to the State of
Idaho at large. Id., 175 P. at 816. In part because the Court found that the purpose
of the tax was “the promotion of the general welfare,” which included some benefit
to the State of Idaho at large.5 Id., 175 P. at 816.

The “for the benefit of the state” discussion in Bevis v. Wright consists of two (2) sentences and a
total of 58 words. By comparison, this paragraph is 179 words, just over three times as long.
5
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The City’s Agreement with HK has a direct benefit to the State of Idaho. The
Agreement allows the City to obtain a groundwater recharge site. Water, in the
State of Idaho, is a finite and precious resource that is owned by the State of Idaho.
Idaho Code § 42-101. The Stormwater Drainage Agreement will be used to recharge
the State of Idaho’s groundwater. Water was of such paramount concern to the
framers that an entire article of the Idaho Constitution is devoted to protecting this
resource. IDAHO CONST. art XV. The benefits from groundwater recharge will not be
solely enjoyed by the people within the geographic boundaries of the City. It will be
enjoyed by all downstream water users, which all reside in the State of Idaho. For
these reasons, the City respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District
Court’s Order and remand this case on the ground that the Stormwater Drainage
Agreement is for the promotion of the public’s general welfare, which includes a
direct benefit to the State of Idaho.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The District Court erred in holding that the general term “state” referred
only to the State of Idaho in § 5-216 and that the District Court was not required to
review the general term “state” in context of this Court’s prior decisions. The City of
Idaho Falls respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court’s order,
hold that § 5-216’s exemption applies to all of Idaho’s governmental subdivisions,
and remand this case for additional proceedings.
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Dated this 23 day of October, 2017.

s/ Michael Kirkham
Michael Kirkham
Attorney for Appellant
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